Deep Reinforcement Learning for Cybersecurity Assessment of Wind
  Integrated Power Systems by Liu, XiaoRui et al.
1Deep Reinforcement Learning for Cybersecurity
Assessment of Wind Integrated Power Systems
XiaoRui Liu, Student Member, IEEE, Juan Ospina, Member, IEEE, and
Charalambos Konstantinou, Member, IEEE
Abstract—The integration of renewable energy sources (RES),
and specifically wind and solar PV systems, is rapidly increasing
in electric power systems (EPS). While the inclusion of these
intermittent RES coupled with the wide-scale deployment of
communication and sensing devices is important towards a
fully smart and modern grid, it has also expanded the cyber-
threat landscape, effectively making power systems vulnerable
to cyberattacks. This paper proposes a cybersecurity assessment
approach designed to assess the cyberphysical security of EPS.
The work takes into consideration the intermittent generation
of RES, vulnerabilities introduced by microprocessor-based elec-
tronic information and operational technology (IT/OT) devices,
and contingency analysis results. The proposed approach utilizes
deep reinforcement learning (DRL) and an adapted Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) score tailored to assess
vulnerabilities in EPS, in order to identify the optimal attack
transition policy based on N − 2 contingency results, i.e., the
simultaneous failure of two system elements. The effectiveness of
the approach is validated via numerical and real-time simulation
experiments, which in turn, demonstrate how the proposed
process successfully identifies potential threats that can be utilized
by attackers to cause critical EPS disruptions.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity assessment, contingency analysis,
cyberattacks, deep reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power grid is the cornerstone of all critical infrastruc-
tures. The safe and secure functionality of electric power sys-
tems (EPS) is directly related to every aspect of the economy
and society. In the last decades, worldwide energy demand has
significantly increased and is estimated to continue to do so
by nearly 50% by 2050 [1]. Due to the increasing energy
demand as well as the need to enhance system efficiency
and asset reliability, the technological modernization of the
power grid infrastructure has become an immediate priority
for governments and energy stakeholders around the world.
This modernization, alongside with environmental concerns,
are driving factors for the integration of renewable energy
sources (RES) to the power grid. For example, the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) indicates that, in 2019, wind
was responsible for generating approximately 42% of RES
generated power at utility-scale facilities in the U.S., and 7.3%
of the total U.S. electricity generation, making it the most
popular RES [2].
There are still many challenges that need to be addressed
before a harmonious integration of RES. Some of these
challenges are directly related to the intermittent nature of
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RES, their effects on power system security and contingency
analyses, and the growing number of cybersecurity threats that
threaten electronic devices supporting EPS operation.
A. Paper Motivation
The cybersecurity assessment approach presented in this pa-
per aims to provide an effective way for system operators and
stakeholders to assess the cyberphysical security of EPS with
high penetration of renewables and a large number of com-
puting, communication, and sensing devices. The proposed
approach follows a step-by-step process, from an attacker’s
point of view, designed to identify the most critical threats
an adversary can leverage to compromise the targeted EPS.
In particular, our work addresses key challenges identified
when performing cybersecurity assessments in modern EPS:
(1) it captures the impact that intermittent RES generation,
and specifically wind generation, has in contingency analyses,
and (2) it considers vulnerabilities that exist in information
and operational technology (IT/OT) electronic devices within
system nodes that can potentially cause adverse effects in
the EPS operation. In addition, the proposed approach per-
forms the cybersecurity assessment without the need for full
observability of the cyberphysical system, i.e., the physical
(electrical) and the cyber (communication network) systems.
1) Wind Intermittency and Impact on Contingency Analysis:
Even though wind integration aids in accommodating the
increasing power demand, its intermittent nature introduces
challenges related to the mismatch between supply and de-
mand. For instance, short-term wind power fluctuations occur
on a second or sub-second timescale during which load
balancing methods do not yet operate. Thus, to ensure system
stability, critical aspects such as optimal location, power flow,
and generation variance must be taken into consideration when
interconnecting wind energy systems.
Traditionally, contingency analysis have been used to assess
physical power system security in EPS [3]. This is achieved by
calculating the power flow of all the lines and elements of the
system in the event of a single or multiple failures. In essence,
a contingency is the failure or loss of any element such as a
circuit breaker, generator, or transmission line. Contingencies
can be planned or unplanned. Planned contingencies include
events resulting from scheduled maintenance and proactive
emergency preparedness, while unplanned events include fluc-
tuating wind injections, cyberattacks, human errors, etc. The
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) re-
quires system operators to meet the N − 1 security constraint
and classifies systems into four main categories [4]. These
categories are shown in Table I.
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NERC TPL-001-4 CONTINGENCY CATEGORIES.
Category Contingency Case
A No contingency
B N − 1
C N − 1− 1 or N − 2
D N − k, k > 2 (cascading)
The intermittent nature of wind power generates challenges
when performing security studies of power systems based on
contingency analysis. Their intermittency can rapidly change
the most critical contingencies of the system or create a num-
ber of contingencies (λ) that exceeds the maximum number of
contingencies that the system can handle (k); thus leading to
cascading scenarios. A prime example of insufficient security
margins is the widespread power outage across the U.K. in
2019 [5]. The near-simultaneous loss of two generation sites,
one being an offshore wind farm and the other one a gas-fired
power station, resulted in a massive under-frequency event.
Load shedding mechanisms responded immediately causing
a major disturbance that affected nearly one million people.
A detailed study on the effect of intermittent wind power
generation on contingency results is presented in Section III.
2) Vulnerabilities of IT/OT Electronic Devices: The power
grid is experiencing a rapid move towards a more intercon-
nected system. Currently, OT electronic devices deployed and
operated at all scales and levels of the power system are being
designed and retrofitted with IT devices to support communi-
cation processes and protocols that enhance the controllability
and observability of the system. The use of such digital
electronic devices with software applications, module, drivers,
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, and network re-
sources is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it assists in
the development of the future modern and advanced grid in
terms of optimizing asset utilization, addressing disturbances,
providing better power quality, and accommodating all storage
and generation options with grid-support functions. On the
other hand, the coupling between such cyber-electronic devices
and physical components in power systems has altered the
threat model. In the past, the threat model has been solely
focused on physical threats. However, due to the integration of
such network-controlled components, the security challenges
need to consider both the cyber and physical nature of the
grid, addressing the growing number of emerging threats.
Some examples of these potential threats are presented in
[6]–[8]; it has been demonstrated that attackers can leverage
publicly available sources by using open-source intelligence
(OSINT) techniques combined with open-source exploitation
methods in order to spoof GPS signals coming from phasor
measurement units (PMUs). Another example is presented in
[9], where a real-world attack within the Ukrainian power
system is accomplished by injecting malicious firmware in
serial-to-Ethernet gateways at targeted substations. Attackers
were able to trip circuit breakers and cause a blackout that
affected approximately 225,000 customers.
B. Related Work
In this part, we explore some of the state-of-the-art ap-
proaches being proposed by researchers that aim to address
issues related to: (1) N − k contingencies simulations consid-
ering intermittent RES generation, (2) assessing the severity of
electronic devices security vulnerabilities, and (3) vulnerability
and risk assessments methods for cyberphysical EPS.
1) Methods for N-k Contingency Analysis: Towards reduc-
ing the occurrence of cascading failures, existing research
efforts have focused on proposing efficient methods that can
perform studies based N − k contingency scenarios. Due to
the size and complexity of power systems, these “what-if”
contingency scenarios are based on computationally expensive
optimal power flow processes. Research in this area aims
to address the computational overhead of N !/[k!(N − k)!]
simulations for N − k contingencies. For example, the work
in [10] describes a fast-bounding case which requires a small
online memory model. Other efforts compute the active power
flow change at lines and the voltage change at buses to evaluate
the severity of N − 1 and N − 2 contingencies [11]. In
[12], a graph-based power model analysis is presented for
contingency ranking. In [13], a heuristics pruning approach for
identifying N−k contingencies is discussed while a topology-
based algorithm that considers whether the generator or line
is in densely populated areas is presented in [14]. The authors
use the concepts of closeness and betweenness centrality to
determine the component’s importance for a N − k criterion.
One of the main challenges of performing contingency
studies in power systems with high penetration of wind is
that the uncertain nature of wind causes high variability when
identifying the most critical N−k contingencies of the system.
Existing studies do not often take into account this variability
[15]–[17]. The authors in [16] and [18] demonstrate some of
the effects that intermittent power generation has in critical
contingency identification. They present probabilistic power
flow studies that show how the variable nature of power
flow, due to wind fluctuations and uncertainties, can alter
the number and location of the most critical contingencies
recognized by system operators. The correct identification of
these critical contingencies is of paramount importance as they
can be potentially leveraged by adversaries in order to cause
major disruptions in EPS [6], [7], [19], [20].
2) Severity Assessment of Electronic Devices Security Vul-
nerabilities: The wide-scale integration of information and
communication technologies in the form of digital electronic
devices into the electrical grid expands the list of possible
attack vectors that adversaries could exploit to cause ma-
jor disruptive events. Hence, in order to ensure the secure
operation of the entire system, it is essential to consider
the inherent vulnerabilities introduced by the grid-supporting
OT/IT infrastructure.
One scoring system that is widely used for device-level
vulnerability assessments in the IT industry is the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [21]. The CVSS can
assess the severity of software, hardware, and firmware vul-
nerabilities by using numerical scores. One example of its
use can be found in [22]. Here, the authors utilize CVSS to
estimate the probability of successfully exploiting identified
3independent vulnerabilities, including zero-days, existing in
components connected to the LAN of a supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) system. Another example of
CVSS use can be found in [23], where a CVSS-based cyber
asset impact score is presented with the objective of providing
a real-time cyber impact severity score that can be used as a
basis for processes such as vulnerability management, isolation
of cyber assets, and system reconfiguration.
3) Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Methods for Cyber-
physical EPS: Several researchers have focused on develop-
ing system-wide security assessment tools aimed to identify
possible vulnerabilities and attack vectors which can be sub-
sequently used to produce optimal control policies designed
to guide secure operations of cyberphysical EPS. One exam-
ple is presented in [24]; the authors propose power system
emergency control mechanisms based on Deep Q-Networks
(DQNs) to maintain the reliable operation of the system by
performing dynamic breaking of generation and undervoltage
load shedding. An extensive review of the latest Artificial
Intelligence/Deep Reinforcement Learning (AI/DRL) models
used for cybersecurity purposes can be found in [25]–[27].
These studies provide an overview of how AI/DRL models
are being used to improve cybersecurity in EPS operations.
Other works have focused on more traditional ranking
mechanisms to improve EPS cybersecurity. For example,
the research presented in [14] assesses system vulnerability
from the cyberphysical security perspective using contingency
ranking methods and a cyber-intrusion ranking methodology.
Similarly, in [28], an operational reliability impact assessment
framework has been developed. In this study, the authors
incorporate cyberphysical threats in the assessment of the EPS
operation. Another approach is presented in [29], describing an
overload risk assessment method based on N −1 contingency
analysis and wind penetration.
C. Paper Contributions
While the research studies described above have yielded
fruitful results, prior efforts have critical shortcomings that
restrict their utility and broader applicability in modern cy-
berphysical EPS as they do not concurrently consider: (1)
contingency analysis studies that take into account intermittent
wind generation when performing the cyberphysical security
assessment of the EPS, (2) threat models that incorporate
quantitative evaluations regarding vulnerabilities of OT/IT
electronic devices when identifying the optimal attack transi-
tion policy, and (3) the use of reinforcement learning models
that alleviate the problem of requiring full observability of the
system from the attackers perspective when performing the
assessment.
In this work, we provide a cybersecurity assessment ap-
proach for wind integrated EPS that leverage the use of DRL
paradigm while considering the inherent vulnerabilities of
adopting COTS electronic devices. The proposed approach
takes into account physical-based aspects such as contingency
analysis and wind uncertainty, together with cyber-based as-
pects such as quantitative scoring systems of vulnerabilities
identified in IT/OT devices supporting the grid infrastructure.
Our approach is capable of identifying potential threats that
can be utilized by attackers to cause serious disruptions in
EPS. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
(1) We propose a cybersecurity assessment approach that
considers adversaries that make use of OSINT modeling
techniques to construct models of power systems which then
are used, in tandem, with contingency analysis that takes into
account wind intermittent generation, to identify the critical
cyber and physical vulnerabilities of the EPS as a cyberphys-
ical system. The assessment process is performed without the
need for full observability of the system since it models the
state of the power system as a partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP) that is solved using DQNs. The
solution given by the proposed DQN reveals the optimal attack
transition policy that an adversary would follow to potentially
induce cascading failures in the assessed cyberphysical EPS.
(2) We propose an adapted version of CVSS based on
contingency analysis results and vital information, from the
power and communication networks, that reveal cyber and
physical vulnerabilities within system nodes. The adapted
CVSS is used to generate a transition graph designed to assess
the complexity of each possible attack path based on various
adversarial strategies.
(3) We evaluate the performance of the proposed methodol-
ogy using digital real-time simulations on test power systems
highlighting its value in a real-world cyberphysical scenario.
We also demonstrate how our algorithm can be utilized by
system operators to assess the weaknesses of the power grid.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the methodology of the proposed cybersecurity
assessment approach. Section III presents contingency analysis
simulation results for various power system test cases. In
Section IV, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
cybersecurity assessment approach and compare different tran-
sition techniques. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
In this section, we provide the methodology of the pro-
posed approach. Fig. 1 shows the step-by-step process that
our cybersecurity assessment approach follows. The assess-
ment process determines first the (1) threat model based on
adversary objectives and capabilities. Specifically, our work
considers an attacker that leverages OSINT techniques to run
(2) contingency analysis with the objective of identifying the
set of k critical contingencies of the system. Our results focus
on two contingencies which assess the power system condition
when two components are lost, i.e., k = 2. However, the pro-
posed approach can be extended to consider higher number of
contingencies. To proceed with the assessment process without
the need for full system observability, the proposed approach
creates a (3) POMDP by defining a transition probability (TP )
based on the proposed adapted version of the CVSS score
metric. The score evaluates the difficulty of each network
transition in the generated system graph. Then, the POMDP
is solved using a (4) DRL model designed to find the optimal
attack policy between the previously identified contingencies.
Finally, the (5) output of the cybersecurity assessment process
evaluates the potential threat by revealing the optimal attack
4Figure 1. Graphical depiction of the major steps of the proposed cybersecurity assessment process and the optimal attack transition policy given as output.
transition policy between the identified contingency pair which
could cause cascading failures in the physical system. The
details of each step are presented in the following subsections.
A. Step 1: Threat Model
In this work, we consider a threat model in which an
attacker can leverage publicly available information using
OSINT techniques to collect sufficient system data such as
the line parameters and status of circuit breakers. Also, the
attacker is able to acquire data to calculate power flow and
therefore run contingency analysis [7]. Depending on the
degree of system contingencies (e.g., N − 1 secure system),
the adversary can leverage the ranking results of contingency
algorithms to identify which system elements if “removed” can
lead to an insecure power system state. Although a plethora
of public power system information is available, it is unlikely
that the attacker will ever have full knowledge and real-time
observability of the system [30]. In our approach, it is assumed
that the attacker, in spite of having the necessary information
to perform contingency analysis via OSINT techniques, he/she
does not have the full state information of the system. Specif-
ically, while the adversarial agent is transitioning through
the cyber system network to exploit vulnerabilities in the
identified double contingency nodes, he/she is unaware of
his/her position relative to the contingencies and the cyber
network transition complexities (based on the adapted CVSS)
of the different attack paths.
In addition, we assume that the cyber system network
graph is isomorphic with the physical system graph, indicating
that the topology of the communication network is mapped
with the topology of the physical system. Therefore, we
model the environment as a POMDP in which the agent
may only access the current state and make an observation
for obtaining possible actions in each state (Step 3). Based
on the observation results for each state-action combination,
the network TP is calculated. This probability reveals the
transition complexity between different states. By leveraging
this methodology, a DQN-based algorithm is then utilized
to identify the optimal attack transition policy between the
critical contingency elements (Step 4).
B. Step 2: Contingency Analysis
In order to find the attacker’s optimal attack transition
policy, we first need to identify the set of critical double
contingencies of the physical power system (e.g., simultaneous
N − 2 or consecutively N − 1− 1). We utilize a fast pruning
N − 2 algorithm to find all the thermal constraint violations
via linear power flow approximation [31]. The algorithm is
initiated based on the set of all N − 2 pairs. The contingency
candidate list is pruned using line outage distribution factors
(LODFs). LODFs describe the power flow impact on other
lines when a line outage occurs. The pruning approach is based
on the thermal constraints of lines, running until the number of
contingencies included in the set does not change. If the LODF
exceeds its thermal constraint, it is added to the contingency
candidate set. The line overload condition can be written as
Axy ·Bxc+Ayx ·Byc > 1, where x and y are lines experiencing
outages, z is an arbitrary line experiencing power flow changes,
and c is a possible constraint. Matrix Axy can be calculated
by Axy = (1 + Lxy · fy/fx)/(1− Lyx · Lxy), where L is the
LODF shown in Eq. (1). This equation describes the change in
the flow through line x, where fx is the original flow, and f ′x
is the flow after the outage. Correspondingly, fy represents the
flow through line y before the line is tripped. Matrix Bxc is
calculated by Bxc = fx·Lzx/(f criticalz ±fz), where f criticalz is
the bound value, and the ± sign corresponds to the conditions
f ′z < −f criticalz and f ′z > f criticalz , respectively. Eq. (2) shows
the power flow variance experienced by line z when lines x
and y are experiencing outages.
Lxy =
f
′
x − fx
fy
(1)
f
′
z−fz =
Lzx · (fx + Lxy · fy)
1− Lyx · Lxy +
Lzy · (fy + Lyx · fx)
1− Lyx · Lxy (2)
C. Step 3: POMDP Transition Model Based on Adapted CVSS
After finding the most critical contingency set, the pro-
cess advances to create the corresponding POMDP of the
cyberphysical-graph environment by calculating the corre-
sponding TP between the different nodes of the system.
Generally, POMDPs are used to model the response and
outcomes of systems when different actions are performed
at specific states. In our environment, observations made by
the attacker do not provide full state information, i.e., the
agent does not know apriori how many nodes the system has
nor their respective states, and he/she needs to observe the
environment to determine potential actions, hence the selection
5Figure 2. Overview of the transition probability (TP ) assessment.
of POMDP system modeling. POMDPs can be mathematically
modeled as a 6-tuple (S,A,Ω, P,R,O), where S is the set of
all possible states in a given environment, A contains all the
agent’s potential actions, Ω is a set which includes all possible
observations, P is the TP for each state, R is the reward
function for performing different actions, and O represents
conditional observation probabilities. At the current state s,
given the TP and observation o, the agent takes action a to
move to the next state s′. As a result of this state-action pair,
the agent receives reward R. This process repeats until the
terminal state is reached. In this POMDP formulation, the TP
for each state is an essential factor that must be determined
adequately according to the process being modeled. In our
case, the TP relies on the cyber system vulnerabilities, i.e.,
vulnerabilities that exist in electronic devices, and their poten-
tial impacts related to the physical system, i.e., the identified
power system contingencies.
Considering the cyber network system vulnerabilities as
well as the optimal attack transition policy between the
identified contingencies (physical vulnerabilities), a TP for
each transition step (between cyberphysical system nodes)
can be determined. These probabilities aid in the traversal
agent’s decision making since the values reveal the difference
in complexity and difficulty for each transition, i.e., how
vulnerable is the cyberphysical system at each node, i.e., bus,
from the point of view of the attacker transition policy. In each
step, the node’s identified cyber and physical characteristics
including the electronic device vulnerabilities, thermal limits
of lines, and power generation are considered. A graphical
illustration of this procedure is shown in Fig. 2. In this work,
we compute the TP using an adapted version of CVSS v3.1.
CVSS is a vulnerability scoring system generally used in
the IT industry to assess the severity of identified computer
system’s vulnerabilities. Although there exist temporal and en-
vironmental metrics in CVSS, their main aim is to reflect how
vulnerabilities change over time or demonstrate uniqueness to
a particular user’s environment [21]. For our application, base
metrics portray a better picture regarding how the cyber and
physical vulnerabilities at each power system node affect the
transition difficulty of the threat. More specifically, the base
score provides a comprehensive assessment of the intrinsic
characteristics of identified vulnerabilities using quantitative
Exploitability and Impact metrics as shown in Fig. 3. The
range of scores goes from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most
severe – maximum value.
1) Exploitability Metric: This metric describes the diffi-
culty and technical means by which a software, hardware,
or firmware vulnerability can be exploited. In our case, the
exploitability represents the difficulty of vulnerability exploita-
Figure 3. Outline of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base
metric.
tion for each electronic device that exists in a particular node
of the cyber-layer of the power system. In other words, it
represents the complexity of the transition based on the type
of node (i.e., PQ or PV power system bus) to which the
agent is transitioning to. The overall score of this metric is
determined by five submetrics, described below.
a) Attack Vector (AV) – This metric is defined as one of
the following categories: network, adjacent network, local
network, or physical. In a network attack, an adversary exploits
a vulnerable device bound to the network stack. This type of
attack is conducted through the Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) layer 3. In an EPS, an attacker may conduct a network
attack by manipulating TCP-level packets flowing across a
substation network. In an adjacent attack, the adversary also
exploits vulnerable devices bound to the network stack, how-
ever, the attack cannot be performed across an OSI layer 3
boundary. In essence, the attack is limited to the same shared
physical or logical network. An example of this type of attack
is an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) flooding attack that
leads to a denial-of-service targeted at control and monitoring
devices connected to a LAN segment of a microgrid [32]. In a
local attack, a direct path to the vulnerable element is required
(e.g., local terminal, remote terminal, or deceive legitimate
users into executing malicious instructions). In an EPS, this
type of attack could be performed by executing malicious code
in a local control or monitoring electronic device accessed
via local or remote terminal. Finally, for a physical attack,
actual physical interaction between the attacker and the target
is necessary. In an EPS, this means that the attacker must
compromise the targeted electronic devices through physical
means (e.g., causing physical damage to the devices).
b) Attack Complexity (AC) – This metric represents the
amount of effort an attack on the vulnerable electronic device
would require. The value of this metric, high or low, depends
on the security level of the electronic devices as well as the
adversary’s capabilities and skills. In EPS, generation buses
can be considered of more significance than load buses in
regards to power grid operation and, consequently, possible
threats. Typically, additional security mechanisms are in-place
to protect bulk generation infrastructure [33]. This is accom-
plished by using electronic security devices, physical barriers,
or security monitoring equipment. Hence, as part of our CVSS
vulnerability scoring, PV and PQ buses are considered of
high and low attack complexity, respectively.
c) User Interaction (UI) – This metric reveals whether user
interaction is required to exploit a certain electronic device. It
6quantifies the amount of participation required from a human
user, different from the attacker, to successfully compromise
the targeted device. For example, attackers could attempt to
deceive the system operator to give them access to the control
room via phishing or malware attacks. Due to the importance
of PV buses, we assume that the attacker will require UI
to manipulate a PV bus. On the contrary, it is assumed that
attackers would not need to obtain special permission from
another human user to access PQ buses. The values for this
metric are: required for PV buses, and none for PQ buses.
d) Privileges Required (PR) – This metric determines the
level of privileges needed to carry out an attack, i.e., it evalu-
ates the level of privileges that are required by the attacker
before successfully compromising the vulnerable electronic
device. Similarly to the previous metric, we designate its
values according to the type of power system bus being
evaluated: high for PV buses, and low for PQ buses.
e) Scope (S) – This metric demonstrates whether or not
compromising a particular electronic device will cause im-
plications beyond its security scope. If the scope metric is
defined as changed, attacking the corresponding electronic
device will result in a detrimental implication beyond its
security scope, i.e., will affect the other elements in system.
If the scope is defined as unchanged, it will only cause
implications to elements under the same security scope. In
our context, when a PQ bus is attacked, no major disturbances
are observed in other system’s elements since generation is not
directly affected, thus its scope can be defined as unchanged.
However, if a PV bus is compromised, more severe effects
on surrounding nodes of the physical EPS network, caused by
power stability issues, are observed. In this case, the scenario
needs to be characterized of changed scope.
Following the description of the exploitability metrics, Table
II shows a detailed comparison between the metrics values
found in different available scoring systems. These scoring
systems are the CVSS v3.1 [21], CVSS v2.0 [34], and the
Industrial Vulnerability Scoring System (IVSS) [35]. CVSS
v3.1 is the most up to date scoring system which provides the
most accurate way of capturing the main characteristics of a
vulnerability via numerical scores. IVSS is an outdated scoring
system and not widely used and supported by the community.
Other quantitative risk assessment scoring systems, such as
CCSS [36] and CMSS [37], were also considered when
selecting the appropriate scoring system. However, all of these
scoring systems are based on the previous version of CVSS,
i.e., CVSS v2.0.
2) Impact Metric: In CVSS, the impact metric is used
to evaluate different exploitation methods and capture the
effects of successfully exploited vulnerabilities. This metric
is determined using three factors: confidentiality (C), i.e., the
effect on system information disclosure, integrity (In), i.e.,
how detrimental the modification of system data would be,
and availability (A), i.e., the system accessibility after an
adverse effect has occurred. During an attack, an adversary
can cause high, low, or no impact in each specified factor. For
our study, the impact metric is designed to capture the effect of
different exploited vulnerabilities in the EPS. During an attack
on a PV or a PQ bus, the system may experience varying
Table II
EXPLOITABILITY SUBMETRICS COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT SCORE
SYSTEMS: CVSS V3.1, CVSS V2.0, AND IVSS.
Score
System Metric Abb.
Metric
Value
Num.
Value
CVSS
v3.1
Attack
Vector AV
Network 0.85
Adjacent
network 0.62
Local
network 0.55
Physical 0.2
Attack
Complexity AC
Low 0.77
High 0.44
User
Interaction UI
None 0.85
Required 0.62
Privileges
Required
PR
None 0.85
Low 0.62 if S = Unchanged0.68 if S = Changed
High 0.27 if S = Unchanged0.50 if S = Changed
CVSS
v2.0
Access (Attack)
Vector
AV
Network 1.0
Adjacent
network 0.646
Local
network 0.395
Access (Attack)
Complexity AC
Low 0.71
Medium 0.61
High 0.35
Authentication
(v3.1 - Privileges
Required)
AU
(PR)
None 0.704
Single 0.56
Multiple 0.45
IVSS
Access (Attack)
Vector
AV
Remote
(v3.1 Network) 1.0
Local network
(v3.1 Adjacent) 0.7
Local host
(v3.1 Local) 0.4
Physical 0.2
Exploit
(v3.1 Attack)
Complexity
EC
(AC)
Low 1.0
Moderate 0.5
High 0.2
User
Interaction UI
No 1.0
Yes 0.3
Authentication
(v3.1 - Privileges
Required)
AU
(PR)
None 1.0
User
(v3.1 - Low) 0.6
Admin
(v3.1 - High) 0.2
degrees of impacts related to total loss, some loss, or no loss
of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of certain grid-
supporting devices. More specifically, if the attacker is able to
attack a PV bus, we assume a worst-case scenario since the
attacker demonstrated to have enough information and skills
to attack a highly secure system and possibly has the means to
exploit additional vulnerabilities. This, in turn, may result in
a total loss of integrity, confidentiality, and availability. Using
this assumption, the impact of compromising a PV will cause
high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. On
the other hand, despite existing research demonstrating the
importance of load altering attacks on power system stability
[38], manipulation of PQ buses and load change attacks will
likely not result in interruption of the operation of generator,
load, or transmission line in the system due to frequency
load shedding protections [39]. Under these circumstances,
the impact of a compromised PQ bus will not be significant
enough when compared to the impact a compromised PV bus
7[40]. Thus, we assume that compromising PQ buses will have
low impact in all three categories. Finally, the no impact value
is used when an attack compromises an electronic device that
is not connected to any PV or PQ bus.
Based on the exploitability and impact metrics, CVSS can
be calculated as [21]:
CV SS =
{
min {E + I, 10}, if S unchanged
min {1.08 · (E + I), 10}, if S changed (3)
E = (AV ·AC · UI · PR) · 8.22 (4)
I =
 6.42 · Ib, if S unchanged7.52 · (Ib − 0.029)−
3.25 · (Ib − 0.02)15, if S changed
(5)
where Ib = 1 − [(1 − C) · (1 − In) · (1 − A)]. E, AV , AC,
UI , PR, S, and I represent the exploitability metric, attack
vector, attack complexity, user interaction, privileges required,
scope, and impact metrics, respectively. The calculated CVSS
value is used as a major factor in the computation of the TP
within our transition model.
The traditional CVSS scoring method provides a detailed
calculation process that assesses the impact of exploiting a
vulnerability with different attack vectors. However, it cannot
be used directly for our application since it fails to consider im-
portant factors when used to evaluate complex cyberphysical
systems. In particular for power systems, it does not take into
account features such as system topology, power generation,
and line constraints. Since we assume the adversarial agent
does not have full topological information, we include power
generation and line constraint calculations in our proposed
TP calculation. Since generators provide varying amounts of
power to a system depending on the current state of the grid,
the relative importance of a generator (and hence its attack
impact) is determined by its power output. In addition to con-
sidering the difficulty of transitioning to certain system nodes,
we also examine the overload percentage of the transmission
lines. If the power flow across that line is near its thermal
constraint, the line could be more easily affected by changes
in the surrounding system. Taking each of the aforementioned
aspects into consideration, we define the TP as follows:
TP =
CV SS
10
∗ G∑n
k=1Gk
∗ Pf
λcritical
(6)
where G is the power generation of a connected generator, n is
the total number of generation units in the system, Pf repre-
sents the power flow through transmission lines, and λcritical
is the thermal constraint for the connected transmission line.
For a power system operating under normal conditions, the
range of G/{∑nk=1Gk} ∈ [0, 1] and λcritical ∈ [0, 1]. Since
the CV SS score ∈ [0, 10], we scale it by dividing by 10. A
smaller TP value represents a cyberphysical node vulnerabil-
ity of low severity, i.e., the node has lower possibilities to be
exploited by attackers since it has a lower CVSS score, and it
is less important in terms of overload percentage, generation
amount, and thermal limits. On the contrary, a TP represents
a cyberphysical node vulnerability of high severity.
D. Step 4: Solution of Adversarial Model
After formulating and defining the corresponding POMDP,
in this step, we develop an algorithm to solve the model
and yield the optimal transition policy for the considered
threat. Due to the complexity of EPS, it is important to have
a mechanism to solve sequential decision-making problems
efficiently. In our studies, we develop a DQN-based DRL
algorithm.
1) Q-Learning: Q-learning is an off-policy RL algorithm
designed to find the optimal action an agent needs to take at
the current state. All the actions that the RL agent can take
are evaluated using a Q-value which determines how good
is a particular action in the current state. As shown in Eq.
(7), using the learning rate α ∈ [0, 1], the long term Q-value
is updated using the current Q-value, the estimated optimal
future value, and immediate reward. γ ∈ [0, 1] represents a
discount factor that determines the importance of immediate
rewards compared with potential long-term rewards. A higher
Q-value demonstrates that a series of actions will produce a
higher total accumulated reward. These actions are referred to
as the optimal policy.
Qnew(st, at) = Qold(st, at)
+ α · (R+ γ ·max
a
Q(st+1, a)−Qold(st, at)) (7)
Traditionally, Q-learning is implemented using Q-tables.
However, this approach is not practical nor scalable for solving
large state-action environments. To solve this issue, researchers
in [41] proposed the replacement of Q-tables with deep neural
networks, also known as DQNs.
2) Deep Q-Network (DQN): In order to address the com-
putational overhead of Q-learning when dealing with large,
uncertain, and dynamic environments, DQNs generalize the
approximation of the Q-value function using artificial neural
networks rather than storing every solution in a table. For our
application environment modeled as a POMDP, we assume the
DQN agent starts in a random initial state s (a node in the
cyberphysical network) and transitions to the next state s′ until
it reaches both nodes of the contingency pair, regardless of
transition order. At every step, the agent makes an observation
in order to obtain all possible transitions of the next state. Fig.
4 presents an overview of this process. For example, if the
current state is at node A, the attacker through an observation
o could obtain the potential transitions to the next state which
can be one of K, J, or M. As shown in Eq. (8), an observation
function O generates the observations for each potential action
a′ given state s. This value also reveals whether or not a
contingency is present in the current available actions at the
current state.
O(o|s, a) = O(o|s′, a′) (8)
Once each potential transition is determined, the TP for
each transition needs to be computed (as defined in Eq. (6)).
8Figure 4. An example of the observation process for state A.
These calculated results will be utilized to determine the
security index, SI ′i , when making a transition from s to s
′
as shown in Eq. (9), where γ is a discount factor, and ∆Cp
is the line overload difference between the current state and
each potential transition state. Finally, the maximum value
of the security index which represents the node with the
highest vulnerabilities’ score and overload value, will be used
to compute the corresponding reward function. As shown in
Eq. (10), the reward function considers the overall benefit of
different transitions as it takes into account the security index
of each potential state, SI ′i .
SI ′i = max
a∈A
γ ·
∑
s′∈S
TP (s′|s, a) ·∆Cp (9)
R =
∑
s′∈S
TP (s′|s, a) · [∆Cp + SI ′i]) (10)
State-action-rewards tuples are stored in the replay memory
set M for recording agent’s experiences. This memory set
assists in independently training the neural network. All envi-
ronmental information of the current state (weights, biases) is
stored in the action-value parameter θ. In each step, the DQN
combines multi-layered neural networks with existing Q-
learning algorithms to approximate Q(s, a; θ). θ− will change
as the result of changing θ. Eq. (11) demonstrates the updated
target value given by the current state and action, where the
target action-value parameter θ− is equal to θ at the beginning
of the iterations. When this number of iterations is reached
during training, θ− is updated to prevent an obstructed learning
process [42]. Using the parameters described, the loss-function
value can be calculated as shown in Eq. (12) for each state-
action pair. It represents the error between the predicted Q-
value and the target Q-value. The goal is to determine an
optimal policy that minimizes the error and ensures that the
training result will be as close as possible to the target value,
where the target value is the estimated expected return of the
actions taken by the DQN.
yi = R+ γmax
a′
Q
(
s′, a′; θ−i
)
(11)
Li (θi) = E(s,a,R,s′)∼M
[
(yi −Q (s, a; θi))2
]
(12)
The agent performs an action that is selected according to
the designated exploration-exploitation (-greedy) strategy of
Eq. (13). Such strategy controls the degree of exploitation over
exploration. At each step, if exploration is being performed
Figure 5. Process of how the DQN model is utilized as part of the proposed
cybersecurity assessment.
with probability , the algorithm selects a random action at
from the action set. During exploitation with probability 1−,
the action with the maximum Q-value is taken. The target
values θ− will only be updated once the desired number of
iterations has been reached [42]. The overall learning process
is presented in Fig. 5. This learning process is repeated until
a terminal state is reached, i.e., both contingency pairs have
been finally “visited” by the agent.
at =
{
random a′, 
argmaxaQ(s
′, a′; θ), 1−  (13)
E. Step 5: Output of the Assessment Process
An attacker with sufficient OSINT can aggregate enough
power system information (e.g., power generation, capacity,
load consumption, topological data, etc.) to perform contin-
gency analysis and identify critical system elements. These
identified critical contingency elements can be leveraged to
generate cyberattack transition policies following the process
described in previous steps. The generated cyberattack tran-
sition policies take into account vulnerabilities in electronic
devices that exist in the cyber network layer as well as
physical system vulnerabilities related to contingency studies.
The DRL algorithm, DQN, provides a solution known as the
optimal attack transition policy that can be used to attack
the devices controlling the operations of the critical elements
(e.g., microprocessor-based relays controlling circuit breakers,
protocol translator converters, etc.) and thus result in potential
power outages in the EPS. Our methodology can also be
leveraged by control center operators and stakeholders to
identify vulnerable components in the EPS or investigate
potential attack strategies.
III. CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS SIMULATIONS
In this section, we introduce a number of contingency
simulation case studies used to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed approach. These case scenarios prove how
the most critical contingency pairs of a system vary when
wind energy systems are in-place. We provide an analysis
of the varying degrees of severity with different contingency
scenarios and examine how wind generation impacts critical
contingencies. For this validation study, we use a doubly-fed
induction generator (DFIG) model for wind power generation
modeling and digital real-time simulation (OPAL-RT) for
testing the system in a real-time environment.
9Figure 6. IEEE 39 bus system with wind power integration.
Table III
NUMBER OF CONTINGENCIES FOR DIFFERENT CASES AND SCENARIOS.
Case Name N − 1 N − 1− 1 N − 2
IEEE 30 Bus System 1 2 8
IEEE 39 Bus System 13 19 71
IEEE 39 Bus System + 16 24 73Wind (Table IV: SC7, t = 800m)
IEEE 39 Bus System + 17 26 67Wind (Table IV: SC7, t = 1400m)
IEEE 39 Bus System + 16 23 103Wind (Table V: SC5, t = 0m)
UIUC 150 Bus System 176 174 442
Polish 2383 Bus System 2236 2234 15881
A. Contingency Scenarios
First, we run the assessment process of Section II up to Step
2 in order to assess multiple contingency scenarios in different
test systems. In Table III, we present the number of critical
contingencies for N − 1, N − 1 − 1, and N − 2 scenarios
in different power system test cases. For example, the IEEE
39 bus system has 13 N − 1, 19 N − 1 − 1, and 71 critical
N − 2 contingencies without any wind power injection, while
the number of these contingencies varies with different wind
penetration levels. The N − 1 contingencies are determined
by disconnecting each line and observing system responses.
For N − 1− 1, the most severe N − 1 case is removed from
the system, and the process is run again. The N − 2 pruning
algorithm is carried out as described in Section II. In the rest
of the section, we focus on the N − 2 case as the most severe
scenario. It should be noted that the proposed approach can
be adapted, based on user requirements, for any number of
contingencies k.
B. Wind Power Generation Modeling using a DFIG Model
A DFIG model consists of a wound rotor induction gen-
erator driven by wind turbines and an AC/DC/AC insulated-
gate bipolar transistor based pulse width modulated converter.
The DFIG model used in our case studies for modeling wind
energy systems is developed in MATLAB/Simulink. Using this
model, we are able to study the dynamic response of EPS to
wind speed variations and investigate the impact of different
(a)
(b)
Figure 7. (a) Wind speed, and (b) wind power variation for scenario A.
(a)
(b)
Figure 8. (a) Wind speed, and (b) wind power variation for scenario B.
penetrations. Three DFIGs are modeled and integrated to the
IEEE 39 bus system at buses 5, 21, and 26 (Fig. 6) [43]. The
wind speed and wind power data for each wind system are
collected at one minute resolution on May 14, 2020 (1440
mins = 24 hrs) from [44]. In the rest of the paper, we
investigate two scenarios of wind integrated power systems:
scenario A, in which the wind data is collected from three
locations in Tallahassee, FL, with similar variation and power
generation levels. The wind speed and corresponding wind
power generation information are provided in Fig.7(a) and
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Table IV
SCENARIO A: IMPACT OF DIFFERENT WIND POWER INJECTIONS ON THE NUMBER OF N − 2 CONTINGENCIES IN THE IEEE 39 BUS SYSTEM.
Time WF1 WF2 WF3 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC6 SC7
(m) (MW) (MW) (MW) WF1 WF2 WF3 WF1+WF2 WF2+WF3 WF1+WF3 WF1+WF2+WF3
0 2.39 146.90 67.30 71 78 79 78 85 80 84
200 108.10 131.10 125.60 52 77 83 64 92 65 80
400 90.92 54.10 96.80 51 74 81 52 83 62 72
600 2.68 54.79 73.68 71 74 79 76 82 80 83
800 153.70 159.20 155.70 53 77 84 71 100 78 73
1000 93.11 76.37 148.40 52 76 83 51 91 67 82
1200 154.30 117.50 153.80 53 77 83 68 96 78 79
1400 77.52 54.52 105.70 81 74 81 50 83 63 67
Table V
SCENARIO B: IMPACT OF DIFFERENT WIND POWER INJECTIONS ON THE NUMBER OF N − 2 CONTINGENCIES IN THE IEEE 39 BUS SYSTEM.
Time WF1 WF2 WF3 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC6 SC7
(m) (MW) (MW) (MW) WF1 WF2 WF3 WF1+WF2 WF2+WF3 WF1+WF3 WF1+WF2+WF3
0 174.30 136.80 187.30 55 77 91 73 103 85 68
200 30.66 178.00 66.20 74 80 80 81 85 82 87
400 15.39 107.00 29.09 69 77 72 78 79 77 80
600 27.94 3.56 119.20 74 71 82 74 82 86 86
800 179.20 182.90 134.80 56 80 83 80 97 79 67
1000 176.80 178.20 180.20 55 80 89 81 101 86 71
1200 75.87 161.20 178.40 81 78 89 76 100 70 90
1400 126.30 163.90 69.06 52 79 79 70 87 58 81
Fig.7(b). In scenario B, the wind speed and power data are
obtained from three locations in Boston, MA (Wind 1), Dallas,
TX (Wind 2), and Tiffin, OH (Wind 3) with different weather
characteristics. For this scenario, the wind speed and power
generation are shown in Fig.8(a) and Fig.8(b), respectively.
C. Contingency Scenarios with Wind Power Injection
The amount of power produced by wind energy systems
fluctuates due to wind’s intermittent nature. As the generation
changes, power flow varies, which may affect contingency
analysis results. Therefore, we simulate wind power injection
levels at eight distinct timestamps, for the two simulation
scenarios (scenario A and scenario B) throughout one day and
observe the changes in reported contingencies with different
wind penetration. These tests are performed for the IEEE 39
bus system (Fig. 6). As shown in Table IV and Table V,
seven wind power integration simulation cases (SC1-SC7) are
simulated for scenario A and scenario B. For each case, we
present the amount of power injected by the three DFIG-based
wind farms (WF1, WF2, WF3) and the number of identified
N − 2 contingencies.
For scenario A in Table IV, the highest number of N − 2
contingency pairs (100) exists when WF2 and WF3 are
integrated to the system (SC5) with generation of 159.20MW
and 155.70MW, respectively. The least amount of pairs occurs
when WF1 and WF2 turbines are injecting power into the
system (SC4), and the wind power injection for WF1 and WF2
are 77.52MW and 54.52MW, respectively. As shown in the
results, the number of N − 2 contingencies change when the
same amount of power is injected at different locations. Addi-
tionally, injecting varying levels of power in the same location
also changes the number of contingencies. As for scenario B
in Table V, the highest number of N − 2 contingency pairs
(103) exists when WF2 and WF3 are integrated into the system
(SC5), and the wind power injection for WF2 and WF3 are
136.80MW and 187.30MW, respectively. The least amount of
pairs occurs when only WF1 is injecting 126.30MW power
into the system (SC1).
Comparing with the normal case of IEEE 39 bus system
without wind power injections (71 pairs of N−2 contingencies
in Table III), the number of N − 2 contingencies in 38 cases
(out of 56 cases in total in Table IV) of scenario A are
over 71. For scenario B, 44 cases (out of 56 cases in total
in Table V) are more than 71. These results demonstrate
how the intermittent behavior of wind energy directly affects
the number and location of contingencies in EPS with high
penetration of RES. A more specific case that shows how
the intermittent behavior of wind can alter the number of
contingencies can be observed in Table III. The number of
N −2 contingencies can increase or decrease when compared
with the case of no wind injection. One scenario that results
in a lower number of N −2 contingencies is SC7 at t = 1400
where the number of N − 2 contingencies decreases from the
original 71 to 67; thus making the EPS more secure under
contingency conditions. A counterexample of this behavior
can be observed in SC7 at t = 0 where the number of N − 2
contingencies increases from 71 to 84.
D. Digital Real-time Simulation of IEEE 39 Bus System
We further examine the effect of contingency scenarios in
a digital real-time simulation environment. We observe the
impact of intermittent wind power injections across the IEEE
39 bus system by analyzing the variability of all the buses
voltages in the system. At t = 0.3s, a N − 2 contingency
event is triggered by simultaneously disconnecting two three-
phase circuit breakers. To understand the severity of losing
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 9. Contingency scenarios for IEEE 39 bus system: (a) contingency pair at lines 5−8, 6−7 without wind penetration, (b) contingency pair 5−8, 6−7
with wind penetration levels as case of Table IV: SC7, t = 800m, (c) contingency pair 5− 8, 6− 7 with wind penetration as case of Table V: SC5, t = 0m.
(d) contingency pair 10 − 13, 16 − 21 without wind penetration, (e) contingency pair 10 − 13, 16 − 21 with wind penetration as case of Table IV: SC7,
t = 800m, (f) contingency pair 10− 13, 16− 21 with wind penetration as case of Table V: SC5, t = 0m.
critical elements, we disconnect the most critical pair (lines
5 − 8 and 6 − 7) from the N − 2 contingency set of the
IEEE 39 bus system. Fig. 9(a) presents the N − 2 effect that
disconnecting lines 5 − 8 and 6 − 7 have in the test system
without any wind connected. Fig. 9(b) demonstrates the same
contingency scenario (disconnection of lines 5− 8 and 6− 7)
with wind power being injected to the system (Table IV: SC7
t = 800m). In this scenario, WF1, WF2, and WF3 inject
153.70MW, 159.20MW and 155.70MW power to the test case
system, respectively. An additional test scenario is run using
the same contingency pairs (disconnection of lines 5− 8 and
6 − 7) with different wind power injections (Table V: SC5
t = 0m). In this case, WF2 and WF3 inject 136.80MW and
187.30MW, respectively, with the results depicted in Fig.9(c).
In order to understand the effect that different N − 2
contingency pairs may have in the EPS, we perform studies
using different N −2 pairs present in the contingency set. For
these studies, we disconnect a less critical contingency pair
from the N − 2 contingency set. At t = 0.3s, circuit breakers
are tripped at lines 10− 13 and 16− 21, in a test case system
without any wind power penetration, and the respective voltage
variations can be observed in Fig. 9(d). Fig. 9(e) depicts how
the voltage variations change when wind penetration (Table
IV: SC7 t = 800m) is considered under the same contingency
scenario. An additional case (Table V: SC5 t = 0m) with the
contingency pair 10−13, 16−21 is demonstrated in Fig. 9(f).
When comparing the real-time simulation results, we can
observe that the most critical contingency pair (lines 5−8 and
6−7) causes higher voltage variations when compared to a less
critical contingency pair (lines 10− 13 and 16− 21). Several
buses in the EPS reach under and over-voltage values of
around 0.87 p.u. and 1.1 p.u. for the most critical contingency
pair (lines 5−8 and 6−7) and under and over-voltage values of
around 0.92 p.u. and 1.18 p.u. for the less critical contingency
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pair (lines 10 − 13 and 16 − 21). Also, besides observing
the voltage variations different contingency pairs can produce,
we can also observe, in some cases, how the intermittent
behavior of wind power helps to mitigate the severity of line
overloads. Figs. 9(d) – 9(f) demonstrate this behavior. For
instance, in Fig. 9(e), most buses of the power system have
voltage measurements that are closer to the nominal 1.0 p.u
value. On the other hand, the case in Fig. 9(f) shows the
opposite, since some voltage values measured at some buses
are farther apart from 1.0 p.u when compared with the case
where no wind power injection is included, i.e., Fig. 9(d). Our
results demonstrate how important is to coordinate the amount
of wind power as it penetrates the system. For example, the
authors in [17] proposed a scheme for power systems to
maintain N −1 security within different levels of wind power
injection. In addition, a dynamic reserve allocation of DFIG
wind farms is presented in [45] to sustain system frequency
stability. In our case, the results not only demonstrate the
variation of N − 2 contingency numbers but also how these
results can be used to control the penetration level of wind
farms to increase the N−2 secure operational range of power
systems.
IV. RESULTS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED
CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT
This section presents our experimental results that demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed cybersecurity assess-
ment approach. We evaluate the efficacy of the process accord-
ing to the optimal attack transition policies given as outputs. In
this part, we provide the experimental setup for the presented
test cases, the DQN agent model implementation details and
its corresponding hyperparameters. Six test case systems are
used to demonstrate the number of transitions needed to
identify the optimal attack path for the corresponding case.
Furthermore, the performance of the DQN model is evaluated
according to the obtained rewards and losses, i.e., convergence
for each test case. Finally, the effectiveness of the DQN, used
to solve the transition model, is verified by comparing it to
other transition-path policy-finding methods, and specifically
to the: (i) random policy search, (ii) depth-first search (DFS),
(iii) Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm, and an (iv) IVSS-based
DQN model.
A. Experimental Setup and DQN Hyperparameters
The RL DQN model is trained and tested on a 64-bit ma-
chine with an Intel Core i7-7600U, 2.8GHz, and 16.00GB of
memory. The proposed algorithm is implemented in Julia,
a high-level, high-performance, dynamic programming lan-
guage. The DQN solver for POMDP is provided in [46]. The
source files and models associated with this work can be found
at [47]. The DQN hyperparameters are presented in Table VI.
B. Cybersecurity Assessment: Attack-Path Transition Results
In order to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed cyberse-
curity assessment process, we use six test case power systems
related with the contingency studies in Section III (Table III):
Table VI
DQN HYPERPARAMETERS.
DQN Hyperparameters
Num. of hidden layers System size
Num. of hidden neurons 1000
Learning rate (α) 0.005
Activation fcn. ReLu
Optimizer Adam
Max. steps 1000
Max. episodes 100
Replay memory buffer (samples) 1000
Exploration policy -greedylinear decay
Exploration rate () 0.01
Table VII
AVERAGE NUMBER OF TRANSITIONS AND TIMING FOR CYBERPHYSICAL
ATTACKS.
Case Name
# # # TTr TTo
Trans PV PQ (sec) (sec)
IEEE 30 Bus System 9.8 2.6 9.8 76.2 83.6
IEEE 39 Bus System 8.8 0.4 4.6 89.3 96.9
IEEE 39 Bus System + Wind
11.6 0.6 5.8 90.1 97.6
W1 (Table IV: SC7, t = 800m)
IEEE 39 Bus System + Wind
14.8 2.8 7.6 87.8 95.5
W2 (Table V: SC5, t = 0m)
UIUC 150 Bus System 34.0 2.4 28.4 237.9 245.6
Polish 2383 Bus System 35.0 5.4 30.8 1459.5 1506.7
(a) IEEE 30 bus system, (b) IEEE 39 bus system, (c) IEEE 39
bus system with wind W1 (Table IV SC7 at t = 800m), (d)
IEEE 39 bus system with wind W2 (Table V SC5 at t = 0m),
(e) UIUC 150 bus system, and the (f) Polish 2383 bus system.
Based on the identified critical N − 2 pairs, the malicious
agent begins at a random initial state and finds the optimal
attack-path transition policy to the existing and most critical
N −2 contingencies. A contingency is identified when one of
the two buses has been visited by the agent. In Table VII, we
show the number of transitions required to reach both critical
contingencies as well as the number of PV and PQ buses
visited by the agent. For each comparison, five random initial
states are selected for each test system, and the average results
are presented. For example, the IEEE 39 bus system requires
an average of 8.8 transitions to correctly identify the most
critical contingency pair. During the transitions, an average
number of 0.4 generation (PV ) and 4.6 load (PQ) buses
need to be visited, i.e., compromised, by the agent. TTr is
the training and evaluation time (in seconds) needed for the
DQN to ‘learn’ the optimal attack path for different cases,
and TTo is the total time (in seconds) required to complete
the process. The utilization of the Polish 2383 bus system in
our experimental results aids in the evaluation of our proposed
process with a realistic large-scale EPS. As seen in Table VII,
the training and evaluation process of the DQN in a typical
computer with 2.8GHz CPU and 16.00GB RAM requires
an average 1459.5 seconds (approximately 24 minutes), and
a total running time of 1506.7 seconds (approximately 25
minutes).
The results demonstrate that the proposed cybersecurity
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Figure 10. DQN rewards for bus test systems.
process can be used in tandem with medium and long-term
control and planning applications. On the other hand, the
proposed approach would require high computing power in
order to be integrated into very short-term decision making
processes [48].
C. DQN Rewards and Loss Convergence
As mentioned in Section II, the DQN aims to minimize
the loss between the target value and the predicted value. The
DQN agent learns the optimal policy as this loss is minimized.
Here, we verify and evaluate the performance of our proposed
approach by examining the convergence of the DQN loss
during the training process. We also show how the average
reward gradually increases at each step, for each test case, up
to 250 training steps. It should be noted that the total number
of training steps used is 500 while the update frequency of
the plot is set to 2, thus only 250 steps can be observed in
the graph. Fig. 10 shows the rewards for each test case system
and Fig. 11 shows the corresponding loss for each case. As
shown in Fig. 10, the DQN agent progressively ‘learns’ how to
maximize the cumulative rewards in each test case system. At
the same time, as the agent ‘learns’, the loss keeps decreasing
until it converges to a minimum value as depicted in Fig. 11.
These results showcase the training process of the DQN agent
and its performance on all bus test case systems.
D. Effectiveness of DQN: Comparison with other Transition
Techniques
The effectiveness of using a DQN model in our cyber-
security assessment process is demonstrated by comparing
our DQN agent based on the CVSS scoring system with
different techniques that could be used to find the optimal
attack transition policy in a graph. The techniques used to
compare the performance of the proposed DQN are: (i)
random policy search, (ii) DFS, (iii) Dijkstra’s shortest path
algorithm, and (iv) IVSS-based DQN model. The random
transition technique provides a baseline, or naive case, where
transitions are performed in a random manner, i.e., without any
intelligent control mechanisms. DFS is a searching technique
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Figure 11. Average DQN loss for bus test systems.
for traversing a tree structure by starting from an arbitrary
root node and exploring each branch as far as possible before
going back to the root node and continuing to the next branch.
Dijkstra’s algorithm is a more sophisticated way of finding an
optimal path through a graph structure. Dijkstra’s algorithm is
used to solve shortest-path problems in non-negative weighted
graphs by finding an acyclic path between a source and a
target node with the minimum transition cost. Both DFS
and Dijkstra’s search policies need full observability of the
network, hence, for testing purposes in those two cases, we
assume full observability of the system and its corresponding
contingency pair. Finally, the IVSS-based DQN model is
designed to evaluate the differences between the CVSS and
IVSS vulnerability assessment criteria.
The tests conducted are run using the power system test
cases presented in Table VII. For each case, five random initial
states are selected and the average number of transitions is
calculated. The maximum, minimum, and average number of
transitions for each case are shown in the box plots presented
in Fig. 12. From Figs. 12(a) – 12(f), we can observe that, in
general, the results of the DQNs-based transition techniques
tend to require fewer number of transitions, i.e., are more
efficient, when compared with the random and the DFS tran-
sition techniques. When compared with Dijkstra’s algorithm,
our DQN implementation performs slightly worse due to its
iterative learning process. However, Dijkstra’s shortest path
algorithm has the major disadvantage of requiring full system
observability. The results demonstrate the advantages of using
DQN as the main solver technique for our proposed process.
Finally, it can also be observed from Fig. 12 that using
CVSS v.3.1 has major advantages when compared to the IVSS
scoring system. The CVSS-based DQN consistently requires
fewer number of transitions in all evaluated test cases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a cybersecurity assessment ap-
proach designed to assess the cyberphysical security of EPS
with high penetration of wind. The proposed process uses
OSINT and contingency analysis results to identify exploitable
cyberphysical vulnerabilities and generate an optimal attack
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Figure 12. Number of transitions needed for DQN (CVSS-based), DQN (IVSS-based), DFS, random, and Dijkstra transition policies for (a) IEEE 30 bus
system, (b) IEEE 39 bus system, (c) IEEE 39 bus system + Wind W1 (Table IV: SC7, t = 800m), (d) IEEE 39 bus system + Wind W2 (Table V: SC5,
t = 0m), (e) UIUC 150 bus system, and the (f) Polish 2383 bus system.
transition policy, from an adversary perspective, that can be
potentially leveraged to cause major outages in an EPS. The
results provided by the proposed process are critical to improv-
ing cybersecurity visibility for system operators and stakehold-
ers; it provides information regarding the most critical attack-
path an adversary must follow to severely compromise the
system alongside with information about the most vulnerable
elements in the EPS at a particular time. The proposed
approach is tested using digital real-time simulation, realistic
data from various actual wind energy systems, and various
test case power systems. Additionally, results regarding the
training and convergence of the DQN agent, proposed as the
main optimal attack-path transition technique, are presented
and compared with other competing techniques. These results
demonstrate the applicability of the cybersecurity assessment
approach in modern EPS.
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